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Abstract — Botnet, a group of coordinated bots, is becoming the 
main platform of malicious Internet activities like DDOS, click 
fraud, web scraping, spam/rumor distribution, etc. This paper 
focuses on design and experiment of a new approach for botnet 
detection from streaming web server logs, motivated by its wide 
applicability, real-time protection capability, ease of use and 
better security of sensitive data. Our algorithm is inspired by a 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to capture correlation in 
data, and we are first to recognize and adapt Lanczos method to 
improve the time complexity of PCA-based botnet detection 
from cubic to sub-cubic, which enables us to more accurately 
and sensitively detect botnets with sliding time windows rather 
than fixed time windows. We contribute a generalized online 
correlation matrix update formula, and a new termination 
condition for Lanczos iteration for our purpose based on error 
bound and non-decreasing eigenvalues of symmetric matrices. 
On our dataset of an ecommerce website logs, experiments show 
the time cost of Lanczos method with different time windows are 
consistently only 20% to 25% of PCA.  
Keywords-bot detection; botnet; streaming logs; correlation 
matrix; Lanczos iteration; online algorithm. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A bot is a software application that runs automated scripts 
over the Internet [1] to perform malicious tasks like DOS  
attack, website statistics skew, click fraud, price/information 
scraping, spam/rumor distribution, etc. Traditional single bots 
usually execute their tasks at a rate much higher than average 
human users to achieve their goal within a time limit. Recent 
single-bot detection methods, like peak-finding [2], outlier 
detection [3], threat propagation [4], more or less use this 
property of single bots.  
A botnet, as the name suggests, is a group of bots that work 
in a coordinated fashion. In contrast to single bots, a botnet, 
especially those large-scale botnets, they might request 
resources at a human-like speed, but altogether they place a 
heavy burden on the servers and collect large amount of 
information. Because bots in a botnet behave human-like, they 
are much harder to detect, and have become a key platform for 
many Internet attacks.  
Log data have been commonly leveraged for both bot and 
botnet detection. Generally, we can say a log is a sequence of 
data entries order by timestamp, where each data entry carries 
several fields that record the properties of an activity at a 
specific time. The main objective of this paper is to develop 
an efficient botnet detection from large-scale streaming web 
server logs with host identifier, request identifier, and time 
stamp; for example, in this paper we will experiment on 
Apache HTTP access logs. A host identifier could be an IP 
addresses or a MAC addresses, or anything similar; a request 
identifier could be an URL or an IP address, or web API name, 
or anything similar; the concrete forms of those identifiers 
depend on the type of stream-in logs. For Apache HTTP 
access log, a host identifier could be an IP address, or a host 
name, and a request identifier is a URL pointing to some 
resource on the server. Although we focus on sever logs, 
however, the approach can be used to monitor any streaming 
log data with similar information for coordinated behavior.  
The method developed in this paper is the key part of a 
larger bot/botnet detection system prototype overviewed in 
section II. The above objective is motivated by our research 
concerns, business goal and system requirements [5]. First is 
wider applicability. As far as we know, there still lacks 
researches on a generally applicable botnet detection method 
for web servers. Most recent botnet detection methods involve 
a particular type of non-log data. For example, [6] uses 
captcha test results to discover search engine bots, [7] takes 
advantage of an emulator to interact with the botnet, [8] is 
based on knowledge of protocol and DNS traffic, [9] needs to 
construct a user-user graph based on login activities. These 
methods typically intend for a special purpose and need 
additional efforts to collect and pre-process information not 
readily available on the server and sometimes need the 
modeler to understand advanced Internet structure. In 
contrast, our approach is quite “lightweight”, which only 
relies on above-mentioned basic information present in 
various access/activity logs of computer systems/software that 
host network services. Secondly, the time complexity. Users 
stream in their log data to our system; the system monitors the 
streaming log data and in turn provide real-time warning on 
potential malicious hosts. Such real-time feedback has 
requirement on method complexity as well as sensitivity to 
coordinated attack from botnet. Logs usually come in a large 
volume. Users of a medium-scale ecommerce website can 
generate 100,000 log entries in 30 minutes. More popular 
website could have a much bigger number. As far as we know, 
all previous papers mentioned here do not meet our 
requirement. For example, method like in [9] needs hundreds 
of computers to run hours to figure out the botnet. Thirdly, we 
believe our approach will be more secure in the sense that 
users are not required to provide sensitive low-level hardware 
information. Our method also does not need to intercept and 
inspect Internet packets like [10] [11] [12], which could bring 
additional security concerns. Log is the only data we need, and 
our method even allows users to anonymize the identifiers 
before they stream in. Last not the least, it is not possible for 
one method to detect all sorts of bots, and therefore modern 
industrial bot detection system is often an ensemble [13-15] 
integrating heterogenous methods to enhance detection 
capability. The simplicity and ease of use of our approach as 
discussed above: less data preprocessing, less requirement on 
specialized knowledge, less involvement with sensitive data, 
makes for better integration with other methods. 
The method we propose to adapt is Lanczos iteration [16, 
17]. It is a method in numerical linear algebra to estimate 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors, with rigorous theory on its error 
and convergence. Detailed discussion is in section III. This 
idea is inspired by Principal Component Analysis (PCA) that 
captures data correlation by computing eigenvalues 
eigenvectors of correlation matrix. The main contribution of 
this paper can be summarized as the following, to the extent 
of our knowledge: 1) we are the first to investigate PCA-based 
botnet detection from streaming logs; 2) we are the first to 
contribute an algorithm that updates correlation matrix for the 
most general case of sliding window in section III.B; 3) we 
are first to first to recognize and adapt Lanczos method for fast 
botnet detection, and we innovate on the termination condition 
in our setup using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 that leads to 
early termination of each iteration; our experiments in section 
IV further shows its effectiveness.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Principal Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is best known as a 
dimension reduction technique, is also a popular method in 
anomaly detection to detect outliers, for example, finding 
cyber anomalies [18, 19]; those data points not well-
represented by the principal components are considered 
outliers or anomalies. It is also applied for the converse 
purpose to check if there is high-level coordination in the data, 
which has been successfully applied to the monitoring of 
industrial processes [20, 21]. PCA also has been combined 
with KL-divergence to detect botnet from search engine logs 
[22]; in that paper KL-divergence is used to filter users with 
usual “click distribution”, but still full PCA with cubic 
complexity is applied to detect correlation is the user is 
deemed “unusual”. A similar basic idea can also be found in 
[5].  
Mathematically, PCA finds the eigenvalues and their 
eigenvectors of the covariance or correlation matrix s.t. the 
eigenvectors are orthonormal. Those orthonormal 
eigenvectors are then sorted by their eigenvalues and form 
rotated coordinate of the space and are called (first, second, 
…) principal components. In future discussion, we call the 
largest eigenvalue associated with the first principal 
component as the principal weight. 
The major problem of PCA, or in particular the calculation 
of the principal weight from the correlation matrix, is its cubic 
time complexity. The technical purpose of this paper is to use 
Lanczos method to reduce this time complexity. We discuss 
more about this in section III.C. 
B. Bot Detection System Prototype 
Our algorithm plays a key role in a bot detection prototype 
system, which has been filed for patent [5, 23, 24]. The 
general work flow of this system is illustrated in Figure 1, 
working side by side with a Markov chain-based behavior 
model [24]. The latter views bots from a different perspective 
and detects them by their strange activities on the sever. For 
example, a human visiting an ecommerce website usually first 
browse products, make several searches, log in, add product 
to carts, and check out. However, it is hard for bots to follow 
this routine. Such routine can be modelled by Markov chain 
transitions, and bot visit sequence will have low probability in 
this Markov chain. However, this behavior model can only 
detect single bots or botnet-bots individually, lacking the 
ability to discover a botnet as a whole. As mentioned earlier, 
we favor a lightweight botnet detection algorithm, so it can be 
more easily integrated with the workflow. 
 
Figure 1 The workflow of our bot/botnet detection prototype system. 
III. PROBLEM & APPROACH 
A. Problem Formulation 
For botnet detection of streaming log data, PCA provides 
a good start point, and a straightforward solution could be as 
the following: 1) split the streaming logs into time windows 
according to a specified interval; 2) for each time window, 
convert the log entries within a specified time interval to a 
host-request matrix 𝐗 with the integer value at 𝑖th row and 𝑗th 
column, denoted by 𝐗(𝑖, 𝑗), represents the number of times 
host 𝑗 makes request 𝑖; 3) run PCA on each time window, and 
PCA can be applied on 𝐗  to check if the principal weight 
exceeds certain threshold. Above procedure can detect either 
single bots with a large volume of traffic, or a botnet where 
each bot might not make many requests but they correlate with 
each other and altogether still produce a high volume of 
traffic. An example is illustrated in Figure 2. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2 (a) Two single bots, each of which has clearly higher visit rates that 
non-bot hosts. Although their visit counts are not correlated, they dominate 
non-bot visits, leading to a high principal weight of 0.779. (b) A botnet with 
correlated visit counts, with a high principal weight of 0.843. 
Nonetheless, questions arise in the adaptation of PCA to 
our application. First, the time complexity of full PCA used 
in [22] is cubic, which easily breaks down when a large 
number of logs come in. In our application, we are probably 
interested in only the largest eigenvalue and its eigenvector. It 
is obviously not necessary for a full PCA. Secondly, division 
into time windows seems not suitable for monitor of streaming 
data. We are facing an accuracy-sensitivity dilemma: a small 
window will weaken the algorithm’s ability to find bots, since 
fewer data might not provide sufficient evidence for PCA; a 
larger window will slow down the algorithm’s sensitivity, e.g. 
in a massive attack the sever might already be brought down 
before the algorithm starts to analyze the last 30-min window. 
There is no universal criterion for good window length, and it 
is difficult to conduct experiments for different server logs. A 
more professional practice is sliding window, as in industrial 
process monitor [21, 25, 26], but this makes computation even 
more intense. In process control, the “features” as columns of 
data matrix is usually at most hundreds of columns, while in 
our application, the “features” are tens of thousands of host 
identifiers.  
From above discussion, reducing time complexity is the 
top priority if we desire to use sliding window. Our research 
problem can thus be summarized as constructing a fast 
algorithm suitable for using sliding window to monitor large-
scale streaming logs for potential bots/botnets. 
B. Correlation Matrix Update 
Consider the request-host matrix introduced in previous 
section. We evaluate the principal weight from the correlation 
matrix between hosts. After each window slide, this matrix 
will change, so does the correlation matrix. Our first problem 
is how to update the correlation matrix after every time 
window slide before updating the principal weight. The time 
complexity for computing correlation matrix of a 𝑛 × 𝑚 
request-host matrix is 𝑂(𝑛𝑚2), so it is highly uneconomic 
and undesirable to re-compute entire correlation matrix. [21] 
calculated the updates for adding new rows and deleting old 
rows. Our case is more complicated: after every window slide, 
some rows and columns might be removed, some new rows 
and columns might be appended, and other rows and columns 
might have value change.  
Let 𝐗𝑡
o ∈ ℝ𝑛𝑡×𝑚𝑡  be the request-host matrix before the 𝑡th 
window slide, 𝑡 ∈ ℕ+. Then the mean of each column is given 
in the vector 
𝐛𝑡 =
1
𝑛𝑡
(𝐗𝑡
o)T𝟏𝑛𝑡  (1) 
where 𝟏𝑛𝑡 = [1,… ,1]
T ∈ ℝ𝑛𝑡 is a column vector of length 𝑛𝑡 
with all components being 1. Then we call the following as 
the centralize request-host matrix, because each of its column 
has zero mean 
𝐗𝑡 = 𝐗𝑡
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T  (2) 
where 𝚺𝑡 = diag(𝜎𝑡,1, … , 𝜎𝑡,𝑚𝑡) is a diagonal matrix with the 
𝑗th diagonal element 𝜎𝑡,𝑗 being the standard deviation of the 
𝑗th column of 𝐗𝑡
o. The correlation matrix for 𝐗𝑡
o is thus 
𝐑𝑡 =
1
𝑛𝑡 − 1
𝚺𝑡
−1𝐗𝑡
T𝐗𝑡𝚺𝑡
−1  (3) 
Our goal is to find the update formula for 𝐑𝑡+1  using 
information from 𝐗𝑡
o, 𝐛𝑡 , 𝐗𝑡  and 𝐑𝑡 . For simplicity, we can 
assume that the hosts are the same before and after the 
window slide, without loss of generality, i.e. column changes 
can be disregarded when calculating the updates. This is 
because, if there are any added columns or removed columns 
caused by window slide, we can simply add corresponding 
columns (and rows if necessary) into 𝐛𝑡 , 𝐗𝑡 , 𝐑𝑡, and use the 
modified ones for our future inferences. 
Also note correlation is not dependent on row order, 
therefore rows of 𝐗𝑡  can be arbitrarily arranged for our 
convenience. Suppose after the 𝑡th slide,  
1) 𝑛𝑡+1
+  new rows 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o are appended to the bottom of 𝐗𝑡
o, 
each row representing a new request-host vector not 
currently in 𝐗𝑡
o;  
2) 𝑛𝑡+1
−  rows 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o  on top of 𝐗𝑡
o  are removed, meaning 
those requests disappear after the window slide;  
3) other rows have value change denoted by matrix 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o , 
where only the top 𝑐𝑡+1 of 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o  are non-zero.  
Since every window slide is small and of fixed distance, 
thus 𝑛𝑡+1
+ + 𝑛𝑡+1
− + 𝑐𝑡+1 is usually small and can be treated 
as a constant. In future discussion, we also write 𝐗𝑡
o =
[
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
o ] where 𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
o  is the last 𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡+1
−  rows of 𝐗𝑡
o; 
likewise, 𝐗𝑡 = [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]  where 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−  and 𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−  are 
centralized data of 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o  and 𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
o  respectively like in 
(2). We have the following relation for 𝐗
𝑛𝑡+1
+
o , 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o , and 
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o , where 𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡  denotes a 𝑛𝑡+1
− ×𝑚𝑡 zero matrix, and 
𝐗𝑡+1
∗o  is equivalent to 𝐗𝑡+1
o  except for the remove rows are 
replaced by zeros. 
[
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝐗𝑡+1
o ] = [
𝐗𝑡
o − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o
] ≔ 𝐗𝑡+1
∗o   (4) 
The update of mean-value is now given by 
(𝑛𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡+1
+ − 𝑛𝑡+1
− )𝐛𝑡+1
= 𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡 + (𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o )
T
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1+ − (𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o )
T
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− + (𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o )
T
𝟏𝐶𝑡+1 
 
(5) 
Let Δ𝐛𝑡+1
𝑇 = 𝐛𝑡+1
𝑇 − 𝐛𝑡
𝑇 , and note 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+ = 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o −
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1+ 𝐛𝑡+1
𝑇  is data centralization like in (2), we then have 
𝐗𝑡+1
∗ = [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝐗𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1𝐛𝑡+1
T ]
= [
𝐗𝑡
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T + 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1𝐛𝑡+1
T ]
= [
𝐗𝑡
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T + 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ]
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1+ 𝐛𝑡+1
𝑇
]
= [
𝐗𝑡 + (𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
]
= [
𝐗𝑡 − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡
𝑇
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o + 𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− (𝐛𝑡+1
𝑇 − 𝐛𝑡
𝑇)
]
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
]
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− − 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− Δ𝐛𝑡+1
𝑇⏞                      
𝑂(𝑚𝑡(𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1
− )) ]
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
⏞  
𝑂(𝑚𝑡𝑛𝑡+1
+ )
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) 
where we note the top 𝑛𝑡+1
−  rows of 𝐗𝑡+1
∗  must all be zero, and 
thus the time complexity of 𝐗𝑡+1
∗  is 𝑂(𝑚𝑡(𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡+1
− +
𝑛𝑡+1
+ )) = 𝑂(𝑚𝑡𝑛𝑡+1). We now start calculating the update for 
the standard deviations in 𝚺𝑡+1. 
𝜎𝑡+1,𝑗
2 =
‖[
𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
]
𝐗
𝑛𝑡+1
+
o (: , 𝑗)
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡+1
]‖
2
𝑛𝑡+1 − 1
=
‖
𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T(𝑗) + 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T(𝑗) − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]
𝐗
𝑛𝑡+1
+
o (: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡+1+
‖
2
𝑛𝑡+1 − 1
 
   (7) 
We can simplify (7) piece by piece. First expand, 
‖𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 + 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]‖
= ‖𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡‖
2
+ ‖𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]‖
2
+ 2 [𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]]
T
[𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡] 
  (8) 
where 
‖𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡‖
2
= (𝑛𝑡 − 1)𝜎𝑡,𝑗
2   (9) 
𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]
= [
𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 − 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)
−Δ𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− − 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
] 
 (10) 
𝟏𝑛𝑡
T 𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝟏𝑛𝑡
T 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 = 0
⇒ [𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡]
T
[𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡] = 0 
 (11) 
Using (11), we have the following important simplification. 
[
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]
T
[𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡]
= (𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡
𝑇 − [
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
𝟎𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]
T
) [𝐗𝑡
o(: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡]
= −[
𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
𝟎𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
]
T
𝐗𝑡(: , 𝑗) 
 (12) 
Plug (9)~(12) back to (8) and then (7), we have 
(𝑛𝑡+1 − 1)𝜎𝑡+1,𝑗
2
= (𝑛𝑡 − 1)𝜎𝑡,𝑗
2 +‖
‖
𝐛𝑡(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡 − 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗)⏞              
𝑂(𝑛𝑡+1
− )
Δ𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− + 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)⏞                  
𝑂(𝑐𝑡+1) ‖
‖
2
− 2 [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o (: , 𝑗) + 𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o (: , 𝑗)
]
T
𝐗𝑡(: , 𝑗)
⏞                      
𝑂(𝑛𝑡+1
− +𝑐𝑡+1)
+ ‖𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
o (: , 𝑗) − 𝐛𝑡+1(𝑗)𝟏𝑛𝑡+1+
⏞                
𝑂(𝑛𝑡+1
+ )
‖
2
 
  (13) 
Recall the top 𝑐𝑡+1 rows of 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o  are non-zero, thus from 
(13) the time complexity for updating each standard deviation 
is 𝑂(𝑛𝑡+1
− + 𝑐𝑡+1 + 𝑛𝑡+1
+ ), linear to the number of rows that 
are affected by the window slide. The total complexity for 
updating all standard deviations is 𝑂(𝑚𝑡(𝑛𝑡+1
− + 𝑐𝑡+1 +
𝑛𝑡+1
+ )). At last we update the correlation matrix. Using the 
fourth identity of (6) and a technique like (12), we have 
(𝑛𝑡+1 − 1)𝐑𝑡+1 = (𝐗𝑡+1
∗ 𝚺𝑡+1
−1 )T(𝐗𝑡+1
∗ 𝚺𝑡+1
−1 )
= (
𝐗𝑡𝚺𝑡+1
−1 + (𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])𝚺𝑡+1
−1
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+ 𝚺𝑡+1
−1
)
T
× (
𝐗𝑡𝚺𝑡+1
−1 + (𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])𝚺𝑡+1
−1
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+ 𝚺𝑡+1
−1
)
= 𝚺𝑡+1
−1 𝐗𝑡
T𝐗𝑡𝚺𝑡+1
−1 + 𝚺𝑡+1
−1 𝐘𝑡+1𝚺𝑡+1
−1
= (𝑛𝑡 − 1)𝚺𝑡+1
−1 𝚺𝑡𝐑𝑡𝚺𝑡𝚺𝑡+1
−1⏞                
𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2)
+ 𝚺𝑡+1
−1 𝐘𝑡+1𝚺𝑡+1
−1⏞        
𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2)
 
(14) 
where 
𝐘𝑡+1 = 2𝐗𝑡
T (𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
+ (𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
T
(𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
+ 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+  
  (15) 
We then use the following identities multiple times 
𝐗𝑡
T𝟏𝑛𝑡 = 𝟎 ⇒ 𝐗𝑡
T𝐗𝑡
o = 𝐗𝑡
T(𝐗𝑡
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T + 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T)
= 𝐗𝑡
T𝐗𝑡 + 𝐗𝑡
T𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T = 𝐗𝑡
T𝐗𝑡 
 (16) 
[
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ] = 𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡+1
T − [
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝟎(𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− )×𝑚𝑡
]  (17) 
Δ𝐛𝑡+1𝟏𝑛𝑡
T 𝟏𝑛𝑡Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T = 𝑛𝑡Δ𝐛𝑡+1Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T   (18) 
to arrive at 
2𝐗𝑡
T ([
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] + [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
= 2𝐗𝑡
T (𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡+1
T + [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝟎(𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− )×𝑚𝑡
])
= 2𝐗𝑡
T [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
= 2(𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1− + 𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ) 
(19) 
and 
(𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
T
(𝟏𝑛𝑡𝐛𝑡
T − [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] − [
𝟎𝑛𝑡+1− ×𝑚𝑡
𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ])
= (𝟏𝑛𝑡Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T + [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ])
T
(𝟏𝑛𝑡Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T + [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ])
= 𝑛𝑡Δ𝐛𝑡+1Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T + 2Δ𝐛𝑡+1𝟏𝑛𝑡
T [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] 𝚺𝑡+1
−1
+ [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
T
[
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ] 
  (20) 
Continue the simplification (sketch calculation, some steps 
are long and hence omitted, but they are not hard to verify). 
Δ𝐛𝑡+1𝟏𝑛𝑡
T [
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
= Δ𝐛𝑡+1(𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T + 𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o )
= Δ𝐛𝑡+1(𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o + 𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o − 𝑛𝑡+1
− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ) 
(21) 
 
[
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
T
[
𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ]
= (𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T )
T
(𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
o − 𝟏𝑛𝑡+1− 𝐛𝑡+1
T ) + (𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o )
T
(𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o )
= 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1− + (𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o )
T
(𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o ) + 𝑛𝑡+1
− Δ𝐛𝑡+1Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T  
(22) 
Finally, plug (21) and (22) back to (20), and then plug (19) 
and (20) back to (15), and after certain rearrangement, we 
will have 
𝐘𝑡+1 = (𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡+1
− )Δ𝐛𝑡+1Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T⏞              
𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2)
+ 𝐗
𝑛𝑡+1
+
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1+
⏞      
𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2𝑛𝑡+1
+ )
+ 2Δ𝐛𝑡+1𝟏𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
T − 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
T 𝐗𝑛𝑡+1−
⏞                    
𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2𝑛𝑡+1
− )
− (2𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− − 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o − 2𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T )
T
𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o⏞                            
𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2𝑐𝑡+1)
 
  (23) 
For the last addend of (23), we can further use of the last 
identity of (6) to reuse the result of 𝐗𝑡+1. 
2𝐗𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− − 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o − 2𝟏𝑛𝑡−𝑛𝑡+1− Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T
= 2𝐗𝑡+1(1: 𝑛𝑡+1 − 𝑛𝑡+1
+ , : ) + 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o  
 
(24) 
The time complexity for update of correlation matrix 𝐑𝑡+1 is 
clearly 𝑂(𝑚𝑡
2(𝑛𝑡+1
+ + 𝑛𝑡+1
− + 𝑐𝑡+1)) by (14) and (23).  
All updates are summarized in Algorithm 1. Combining 
(6) and (13) the total complexity for correlation matrix update 
is 𝑂(min{𝑚𝑡𝑛𝑡+1, 𝑚𝑡
2(𝑛𝑡+1
+ + 𝑛𝑡+1
− + 𝑐𝑡+1)}), which can be 
considered as quadratic if 𝑛𝑡+1
+ + 𝑛𝑡+1
− + 𝑐𝑡+1 is treated as a 
small constant. This complexity is theoretically down from 
straightforward complete re-evaluation by power of 1. In 
practice, we sometimes could expect even better acceleration, 
as Δ𝐛𝑡+1
T , 𝐗𝑐𝑡+1
o  etc. are very often sparse. 
 
C. Lanczos Method 
In future discussion, for convenience of mathematical 
analysis, we assume the correlation matrix is normalized to 
unit total variance by dividing every element by the number 
of columns, so that the sun of all eigenvalues is 1, the largest 
eigenvalue, i.e. the principal weight is between range [0,1], 
and an eigenvalue larger than 0.5  must be the largest 
eigenvalue. In implementation, we should instead normalize 
the computed eigenvalue to the range of [0,1]  for better 
numerical stability. 
With updated correlation matrix 𝐑𝑘+1 , our task is to 
determine if 𝐑𝑘+1  has a large eigenvalue, i.e. the principal 
weight, is larger than a threshold. If so, we consider there 
exists potential bot visits in the current time window, and 
continue to find those hosts that have high correlation with the 
principal component. Several methods suit for this task, 
including singular value decomposition, which computes the 
full PCA in cubic time, or Rayleigh quotient iteration, which 
finds the exact eigenvalue and eigenvector in cubic time [27]. 
For our purpose, we discussed in III.A that an accurate 
evaluation of eigenvalue is not necessary. We will investigate 
Lanczos method [17, 28], a numerical method to approximate 
the eigenvalues, for its use in our application.  
Given any symmetric matrix 𝐑 ∈ ℝ𝑚×𝑚 (the correlation 
matrix is symmetric) and any non-zero initial vector 𝐱 ∈ ℝ𝑚, 
the Lanczos iteration is expressed as the following process, 
𝐯0 = 𝟎, 𝐯1 =
𝐱
‖𝐱‖
⇒ {
?̃?𝑗 = 𝐑𝐯𝑗−1 − 〈𝐑𝐯𝑗−1, 𝐯𝑗−1⟩𝐯𝑗−1 − ‖?̃?𝑗−1‖𝐯𝑗−2
𝐯𝑗 =
?̃?𝑗
‖?̂?𝑗‖
, 𝑗 = 2,3,… 
  (25) 
The iteration is guaranteed to terminate at 𝑗 = 𝑘0 + 2 when it 
founds ?̃?𝑘0+2 = 𝟎, where 𝑘0  is the smallest positive integer 
s.t. 𝐑𝑘0+1𝐱 ∈ span{𝐱, 𝐑𝐱, … , 𝐑𝑘0𝐱}, and is guaranteed to be 
well-defined, i.e. ‖?̃?𝑗‖ ≠ 0, for 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘0. It can be proved 
that 𝐕𝑘0+1 = [𝐯1, … , 𝐯𝑘0+1]  is an orthonormal basis of 
span{𝐱, 𝐑𝐱, … , 𝐑𝑘0𝐱} . Let 〈⟩  denote the standard inner 
product, and let 𝐕𝑘 = [𝐯1, … , 𝐯𝑘], 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑘0 + 1, then the 
Lanczos decomposition gives 
𝐑𝐕𝑘 = 𝐕𝑘𝐓𝑘 + ?̃?𝑘+1𝐞𝑘
T, ∀𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑘0 + 1  (26) 
where 𝐞𝑘 ∈ ℝ
𝑘 is a vector with only the 𝑘th component being 
1 and all other components being 0, and 
𝐓𝑘 =
(
 
〈𝐑𝐯1, 𝐯1⟩ ‖?̃?2‖
‖?̃?2‖ 〈𝐑𝐯2, 𝐯2⟩ ⋱
⋱ ⋱ ‖?̃?𝑘‖
‖?̃?𝑘‖ 〈𝐑𝐯𝑘, 𝐯𝑘⟩)
  
 
(27) 
is a symmetric tridiagonal matrix. Since ?̃?𝑘+1 is orthogonal to 
every column of 𝐕𝑘, then (26) is equivalent to  
𝐕𝑘
T𝐑𝐕𝑘 = 𝐓𝑘 , ∀𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑘0 + 1  (28) 
One can choose to use either (26) or (28) for their own 
convenience. The more crucial point here for our purpose is 
that the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of 𝐓𝑘 can estimate those 
of 𝐑 . The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a symmetric 
tridiagonal matrix is a basic task in numerical linear algebra, 
[16, 21, 29-32]. They take advantage of the special form of 
symmetric tridiagonal matrices to run faster and more 
accurate than algorithms for general matrices. The eigenvalue 
approximation is robust because the error can be shown 
bounded by the following important theorem,  
• Theorem 1. For any eigenvalue ?̂? of 𝐓𝑘, there exists an 
eigenvalue 𝜆 of 𝐑 s.t |𝜆 − ?̂?| ≤ ‖?̃?𝑘+1‖; or equivalently if 
𝐑  has 𝑚  eigenvalues {𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑚} , then we have 
min
1≤𝑖≤𝑚
|𝜆𝑖 − ?̂?| ≤ ‖?̃?𝑘+1‖. Further, if ?̃? is an eigenvector of 
eigenvalue ?̂? of 𝐓𝑘, then there exists an eigenvalue 𝜆 of 𝐑 
s.t |𝜆 − ?̂?| ≤
‖?̃?𝑘+1‖|〈𝐞𝑘 ,?̃?⟩|
‖?̃?‖
. 
The theorem is stated with a short proof sketch in [17]. 
Since 𝐓𝑘 ∈ ℝ 
𝑘×𝑘 , ?̃? ∈ ℝ𝑘, thus |〈𝐞𝑘 , ?̃?⟩| is the absolute value 
of the last component of eigenvector ?̃? , and 
|〈𝐞𝑘,?̃?⟩|
‖?̃?‖
≤ 1 , 
meaning the second error bound is equal or tighter. Since 
computation of ?̃?  only takes linear time for a tridiagonal 
matrix, we will use the second bound. 
|〈𝐞𝑘,?̃?⟩|
‖?̃?‖
 is usually a small 
value and it decreases with 𝑘 [17, 33]. 
The approximation can also conveniently run in an 
“online” style due to another useful theorem, which implies 
the maximum eigenvalue of 𝐓𝑘  is non-decreasing with 𝑘 . 
Thus, if we are not satisfied with the error bound 𝑑, we can 
increase 𝑘 for better result.  
• Theorem 2. For any symmetric matrix, the maximum 
eigenvalues of its leading principal submatrices are 
always non-decreasing.  
Based on above, we propose the following to terminate the 
iteration early for our application. Suppose we use a threshold 
𝜔 > 0.5 for principal weight, and let 𝑑 =
‖?̃?𝑘+1‖|〈𝐞𝑘 ,?̃?⟩|
‖?̃?‖
, then the 
practical meaning of Theorem 1 is: if we find a large 
eigenvalue ?̂?  of 𝐓𝑘 , then if ?̂? − 𝑑 ≥ 𝜔 , then the largest 
eigenvalue of the “normalized” correlation matrix 𝐑  must 
exceed 𝜔 , and a warning can be immediately raised; in 
contrast, if ?̂? + 𝑑 < 𝜔  and ?̂? − 𝑑 ≥ 0.5 , then the largest 
eigenvalue of 𝐑 must not exceed 𝜔, and we can simply wait 
for next window slide. For ?̂? − 𝑑 < 0.5, we setup as threshold 
𝑐, and if ?̂? − 𝑑 stays below 0.5 for 𝑐 rounds, then the largest 
eigenvalue of 𝐑 is not likely to exceed 𝜔, and we can continue 
to next window slide. This is because the largest eigenvalue 
of 𝐓𝑘  approaches the largest eigenvalue of 𝐑  from below, 
therefore when the estimated eigenvalue plus the error bound 
stays below 0.5 for many iterations, it becomes increasingly 
unlikely for the eigenvalue to exceed a threshold 𝜔 > 0.5. 
Once the largest eigenvalue ?̂?  of 𝐓𝑘  is estimated, its 
eigenvector ?̃?  can be found trivially, because we can set 
?̃?(1)  to any positive number if ‖𝐯2‖ ≠ ?̂? , and ?̃?(1) = 0 
otherwise, then other components of ?̃?  can be solved 
iteratively by 𝐓𝑘?̃? = ?̂??̃? , and ?̂? =
𝐕𝑘?̃?
‖𝐕𝑘?̃?‖
 is the estimated 
principal component of 𝐑 . The correlation between host 𝑗 
and ?̂? can be computed by 𝜌𝑗 = ?̂?(𝑗)√?̂?.  We recommend 
finding the first knee point of the descendingly sorted list of 
all 𝜌𝑗 , e.g. the point before the first sharp slope, which is 
inspired by the scree plot of PCA; meanwhile we can 
disregard hosts with 𝜌𝑗 < 𝜔 in case the knee point is too low. 
Hosts satisfying both criteria are considered as potential bots. 
Finally, we give some more facts that will be used in the 
algorithm. First a loose bound of eigenvalues of 𝐓𝑘 are given 
by 𝜆𝑙 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝜆𝑢 where 
𝜆𝑙 = max{min{〈𝐑𝐯1, 𝐯1⟩ − ‖?̃?2‖, 〈𝐑𝐯𝑖 , 𝐯𝑖⟩ − ‖?̃?𝑖+1‖ − ‖?̃?𝑖‖}, 0} 
𝜆𝑢 = min{max{〈𝐑𝐯1, 𝐯1⟩ + ‖?̃?2‖, 〈𝐑𝐯𝑖 , 𝐯𝑖⟩ + ‖?̃?𝑖+1‖ + ‖?̃?𝑖‖}, trace 𝐓𝑘} 
𝑖 = 2, … , 𝑘 
(29) 
Secondly, the 𝑖th leading principal minor 𝑝𝑖(𝜆) of 𝐓𝑘 − 𝜆𝐈 
can be computed as 
𝑝𝑖(𝜆) = {
1 𝑖 = 0
〈𝐑𝐯1, 𝐯1⟩ − 𝜆 𝑖 = 1
(〈𝐑𝐯𝑖 , 𝐯𝑖⟩ − 𝜆)𝑝𝑖−1(𝜆) − ‖?̃?𝑖‖
2𝑝𝑖−2(𝜆) 𝑖 = 2,… , 𝑘
 
  (30) 
and we use 𝑠𝑘(𝜆) to denote the number of sign changes in 
𝑝0, … , 𝑝𝑘. A complete Lanczos method based bot detection 
algorithm is now as below, based on tridiagonal-matrix 
eigenvalue estimation algorithm in [16, 21], where we 
innovate on the termination condition for our particular 
application using Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. 
 The total time complexity of Algorithm 2 for one window 
slide is 𝑂(𝑘∗𝑚2)  where 𝑘∗  is the value of 𝑘  when the 
computation for the current window slide ends, and 𝑚 is the 
number of distinct hosts. In practice, the average complexity 
scales near quadratic as the average number of 𝑘∗  grows 
slowly with 𝑚. 
For detection of multiple botnets, the part in marked by ⋆ 
in Algorithm 2 can be modified to compute more eigenvalues 
of 𝐓𝑘 by nesting a loop the same as the do-while loop except 
for the total variance is 1 minus the principal weight, and 
termination conditions need corresponding adjustment. We 
omit the detail for space. 
IV. EXPERIMENT & EVALUATION 
We simulated both single bots and botnet on an 
ecommerce web server and collected about four months’ log 
data, totaling 315,688,764 Apache access log entries for our 
experiments, with 3,075,108 distinct request identifiers (URL 
to website resources) and distinct 2,519,022 host identifiers 
(IP addresses or hostname). The human-like visit rate is 
estimated by average interval between two requests of HTML 
web pages, which is 39 secs for this dataset.  
Some of the hosts in the dataset mark themselves as bots. 
They are mostly search engines, like google-bots, bing-bots, 
yahoo-bots. However, they cannot be used as gold standard 
because they are very well-behaved even though they are bots 
and hard to detect. Thus, we have to run simulation. The 
simulation is real on the website server so the generated logs 
are realistic, and it is guaranteed that it is absolutely harmless 
for the target server. The simulation is done in four modes to 
mimic different types of bots. 
1) Single request: the simulator randomly choose a link 
from a fixed list and keeps repeatedly visiting the link 
for two hours, then the simulator picks the next link.  
2) Random list: for every visit, the simulator randomly 
chooses a link from a list to visit. 
3) Fixed list: the simulator visits links of a fixed list in its 
original order. 
4) Focused random walk: the simulator works like a 
crawler – it downloads a webpage, extracts links of 
particular pattern from it, and then randomly picks the 
next link to visit.  
The four modes can mimic different types of bots. For 
example, DOS/DDOS might take the form of any of the first 
three types; click fraud or statistic skewer are usually the 
second and the third form, visiting a list of desired target links; 
price scraper or web crawler could be any of the last three 
types. We have several further comments: 1) multiple log 
entries could be generated for a single visit; 2) for all modes, 
the simulator requests at a Gaussian distributed human-like 
random rate estimated by the true human visits; 3) only one 
computer with a distinct IP is used to simulate each mode, 
therefore the simulation is harmless for a website that handles 
tens of thousands of customers each day. 
The simulated logs for each visit are identified, and then 
duplicated with new host ids and mixed as desired for various 
experiment purposes. For example, we can mimic single-bots 
of high visit rate of each type by duplicating them several 
times in a time window without changing their host id; we can 
mimic a massive bot net of human-like visit rate by choosing 
logs of several different visits, duplicate them many times 
with distinct host ids, and randomly mixed them with existing 
logs in several consecutive windows. The simulated logs are 
used as gold standard for performance analysis.  
A. Performance Analysis 
This section presents comparison of accuracy, runtime and 
sensitivity between PCA and our Lanczos-based algorithm. 
We run PCA with fixed window and Lanczos with both fixed 
window (denoted by Lanczos-B) and sliding window (denoted 
by Lanczos-S). All experiments are restricted to one thread for 
fairness. Both methods have researches on parallelism as 
mentioned in section II.A. For this paper, we focus on 
experiments with one thread. 
For our purpose, we define the accuracy as the percentage 
of known bot visits that can be correctly marked by the 
algorithm. We compare the Lanczos-method based algorithm 
with the full PCA on our dataset and measure both running 
time, accuracy and sensitivity. We experiment on both fixed 
windows and sliding windows of length from 10 mins to 50 
mins. Logs for 2100 single bot visits are placed at random time 
points with 30 times to 50 times faster visit rate than humans; 
100 botnets of 10 to 100 hosts are placed at randomly chosen 
time points with 1 to 5 times human-like visit rate, and for 
simplicity, we let bots in a botnet start working simultaneously 
at the chosen time point, and their visits do not overlap.  Each 
bot/botnet visit lasts from 10 mins to 2hrs. Window slide step 
is 10% of the window length. For parameters of Algorithm 2, 
we let 𝜔 = 0.65, 𝜖1 = 10
−10, 𝜖2 = 0.01, 𝑘𝑙 , 𝑘𝑢 , 𝑘𝑠 are set to 
10%, 80% and 1% of the number of hosts in the window, and 
𝑐 = 25. The value of 𝜖1 is given by [16, 21]. The choice of 
𝜔, 𝜖2, 𝑐 will be experimented in next section. The results for 
time and accuracy are shown in Table 1, and it provides clear 
evidence for the advantage of our algorithm against PCA.  
  Single Bots Botnets(3) Run Time(3) 
10m 
PCA 70.5% 52.4% 12s(1)/213s(2) 
Lanczos-B 70.1% 50.3% 3.6s/20s 
Lanczos-S 73.5% 63.2% 5.5s/44s 
20m 
PCA 59.0% 65.6% 44s/622s 
Lanczos-B 58.2% 64.0% 12s/81s 
Lanczos-S 63.4% 78.9% 15s/121s 
30m 
PCA 53.7% 79.6% 89s/1473s 
Lanczos-B 52.6% 78.1% 21s/134s 
Lanczos-S 59.8% 87.9% 23s/184s 
 
40m 
 
PCA 48.1% 80.9% 131s/1959s 
Lanczos-B 47.5% 79.1% 27s/177s 
Lanczos-S 54.1% 88.2% 30s/214s 
 
50m 
 
PCA 42.1% 77.8% 163s/2607s 
Lanczos-B 41.6% 76.1% 32s/218s 
Lanczos-S 50.3% 85.5% 35s/282s 
Table 1 Accuracy & runtime comparison of PCA with fixed time 
window, Lanczos with fixed time window (Lanczos-B) and Lanczos 
with sliding time window (Lanczos-S). Results in bold are better. (1) 
Average runtime of the algorithm on all time windows; (2) maximum 
runtime; (3) detection of botnets with better accuracy and less running 
time is the main technical purpose of this research. 
Overall, we have several conclusions from Table 1: 1) It is 
not possible to run PCA with sliding window of length longer 
than 20m, as its computation time will generally exceed the 
sliding step; 2) Lanczos-B has competitive performance in 
comparison to PCA for bot detection; 3) Lanczos has much 
better running time, and on average it grows almost linearly 
with the window length; 4) Lanczos with sliding window 
consistently has higher accuracy than fixed window.  
A subtler implication of above results is about choice of 
window length. For single bots, longer window length 
damages performance, which is the weakness of all 
correlation-based botnet detection algorithms. This is because 
if there exists more than one “not-so-correlated” single bots in 
a time window, the principal weight will plunge, and longer 
time window length increases the probability of this situation. 
For botnet, within a range, accuracy increases with window 
length, because more data provide more statistical evidence of 
correlation if the botnet exists, especially when botnets 
include randomness in their visit pattern, like the random walk 
and random list in our simulation. However, longer time 
window usually makes the algorithm less capable of detecting 
bots with shorter visit duration. For example, for 50-min 
window length, botnet visits of less than 20 minutes become 
less discoverable. Given the assumption that botnets often 
have to maintain at least a request per 30 to 40 secs (the 
human-like visit rate of our dataset) to achieve its goal at a 
reasonable cost, 40 minutes’ data generally are sufficient for 
exposing them. In practice, we would recommend running at 
least two threads to monitor a log stream, one with short length 
(like 10-min, 15-min) for discovery of single bots and short-
duration visits of botnets, and the other with medium length 
(like 30-min, 40-min) for detection of other botnets. If 
detection of slower botnet is desired, we can add one more 
thread with longer window length. 
We now present the sensitivity of both PCA and Lanczos-
S which is defined as how much time does the algorithm needs 
to detect the bots since their initial requests. The experiments 
are done for 10-min window length and 40-min window 
length to test how what percentage of bots are detected within 
a specified sensitivity. The results are shown in Figure 3 with 
a point (𝑥, 𝑦) on a curve for algorithm 𝑧 means 𝑥% of the bots 
detected by 𝑧  are detected within 𝑦  minutes of their initial 
request. A higher curve implies better sensitivity. The overall 
average sensitivity results are shown in Table 2. We can 
observe a clear advantage of Lanczos-S from both Figure 3 
and Table 2. The advantage comes from two sources: less 
computation time of Lanczos, and the sliding window. 
Ultimately, it is all due to the less time complexity of Lanczos, 
which enables us to use sliding window rather than fixed 
windows.  
  
(a) 10-min window (b) 40-min window 
Figure 3 Experiment results for the sensitivity of PCA and Lanczos-S. “-Bot” 
suffix means results for single bots, “-Botnet” suffix means results for 
botnet-bots. x-axis marks the time in minutes since initial request, y-axis 
indicates among bots detected by the algorithm, what percentage is detected 
within corresponding minutes since initial request. For example, a point at 
(𝒙, 𝒚) on the curve for PCA-Botnet means 𝒙% of all detected botnet-bots are 
detected within 𝒚 minutes since their initial request. 
 10m-Bot 10m-Botnet 40m-Bot 40m-Botnet 
PCA 9.85m 10.69m 38.20m 42.58m 
Lanczos-S 4.94m 7.34m 25.25m 33.35m 
Table 2 Results of average sensitivity (average time the algorithm needs 
to detect the bots since their initial requests) for PCA and Lanczos-S 
with 10-min and 40-min window lengths.  
B. Experiment on Parameters 
This section presents experiments on parameters 𝜔, 𝑐 and 
𝜖2 and provides some insight into choice of their values. The 
experiments is on the whole dataset with Lanczos-B, because 
Lanczos-S takes too much time, and the results of Lanczos-B 
should be good enough for our discussion. In the case of real 
botnet detection, we can run the following experiments on 
historical logs and decide good values for the parameters. 
For choice of 𝜔, we first run Lanczos-B on the original 
data (without simulation) over all fixed 40-min windows, and 
then use the Markov chain behavior model in section II.B to 
recognize and remove strangely-behaved suspicious hosts, 
and then run the Lanczos-B over all windows again. The 
principal weight distribution change is shown in Figure 4. The 
histogram shows most suspicious hosts are in window with 
principal weights higher than 0.5 quite possibly contain bots. 
However, 1) our algorithm requires that 𝜔 > 0.5 ; 2) we 
emphasize botnet detection, and mile principal weight is less 
likely to imply existence of botnet; 3) the rate of false alarm 
should be contained at a reasonable level. Considering all 
these factors, we choose 𝜔 = 0.65 as our threshold. 
 
Figure 4 Principal weight distribution change after using the Markov chain 
behavior model to remove strangely-behaved hosts from the logs of all 40-
min fixed time windows.  
For choice of 𝑐 , it affects the early termination for a 
window where bots are not likely to exit, and a smaller 𝑐 will 
decease runtime, but possibly introduce certain error. For 
choice of 𝜖2 , it affects the early termination for a window 
where bots are detected, and smaller 𝜖2  indicates a more 
accurate principal component is desired. The results using 
Lanczos-B with both 10-min window and 40-min window are 
shown in Figure 5, and for the experiments in previous section 
we choose parameter value at the “elbow” points in Figure 5 
(b),(d). We in addition remark that: 1) for shorter time window, 
larger 𝑐 may take larger value without hurting much accuracy, 
thus if we run a second thread with short time window as 
suggested in choice of window length in previous section, we 
could specify a larger 𝑐 ; 2) 𝜖2  has stronger effect on 
performance, thus we recommend setting it to a small value 
even for short time window. 
  
(a) 𝑐, 10-min window (b) 𝑐, 40-min window 
  
(c) 𝜖2, 10-min window (d) 𝜖2, 40-min window 
Figure 5 Relation between 𝒄, 𝝐𝟐  with average runtime and accuracy for 
Lanczos method. Smaller 𝒄, 𝝐𝟐 improves accuracy at cost of more runtime. 
For experiments in previous section, we choose 𝒄, 𝝐𝟐 at the elbow point 𝒄 =
𝟐𝟓 and 𝝐𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 of (c) and (d). 
C. Botnet Examples 
We apply our algorithm on the original data without 
simulated logs, and 4,557 distinct hosts are marked as 
potential bots, with 3,417 of them recognized as botnet-bots 
in 232 potential botnets. Botnets discovered in different time 
windows are merged if they share two or more hosts. We use 
an automatic program to compare the IPs with the Barracuda 
IP reputation database and 88% of them have poor reputation. 
Some of the botnets are search engine like “crawl-66-249-
xx.xxx.googlebot.com” that can be actually confirmed. 
Besides that, we manually confirmed one of the top-rated 
botnet that do not mark themselves as bots in the access log, 
which comes from a website monitor company Anturis, as 
shown in Figure 6. Some other botnets are demonstrated in 
Figure 7, which clearly shows that one bot in the botnet might 
play the role of a controller.  
 
Figure 6 A top-rated botnet is manually confirmed from a company 
providing website monitoring service. At the time our experiment, they do 
not mark themselves as bots in the Apache access log. 
 
Figure 7 Some other examples of recognized botnets, where we can see 
usually one bot might play the role of a controller. 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
The main objective of this paper is to recognize botnets 
from streaming web server logs. We recognize and adapt 
Lanczos method to the application of botnet detection. For 
this purpose, we first develop the online correlation matrix 
updates, and feed them to the Lanczos iterations. Making use 
of Lanczos error bound the non-decreasing eigenvalues of 
symmetric matrices, and the special properties of our 
application, a method is proposed to terminate the iterations 
early. Our approach improves time use of eigenvalue-based 
botnet detection from cubic to sub-cubic, which enables us to 
monitor the log stream by sliding windows, rather than batch-
based detection. Experiments show the time cost of Lanczos 
method with different time windows are consistently only 
20% to 25% of PCA. In the future, we could further the 
research in two directions: 1) finding its good use in other 
anomaly detection applications; 2) compensate its weakness 
in single bot detection by the Markov-chain behavior model 
as mentioned in section II.B. 
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